

15 March 2021

By Email: chair@gmanz.nz

Gaming Machine Association of New Zealand
c/o Peter Dengate-Thrush
Independent Chair

ATTENTION: Peter-Dengate Thrush

GAMBLING VENUE POLICY - CONFLICT OF INTEREST

We refer to your email instructions of 26 February 2021, seeking our advice regarding councillor conflicts of interest with respect to decision-making on Council's gambling venue policy.

YOUR QUESTIONS

1. You have asked us to advise whether:
 - a. Membership of a club or organisation that receives gaming machine grant funding would constitute a conflict of interest that would require the councillor to withdraw from decision-making or discussion regarding a proposed gambling venue policy; and
 - b. If Council has itself received gambling grant funding, does this impact on its ability to decide on a gambling venue policy, such that the decision should be made by an independent commissioner?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In summary:
 - a. If an elected member has a financial interest in a club or organisation that may be impacted by the gambling venue policy, the member must not participate in any discussion or decision-making on the policy. It would be rare for a financial interest to arise in this context, but examples may be where the elected member is in a paid role at a club or organisation, and the role is funded from a gaming grant. A more remote interest may arise where the quantum of membership fees paid to a club or organisation may be impacted by a gaming grant. In those circumstances,

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it may be prudent to seek a decision from the Auditor-General as to whether the potential interest is deemed too remote to influence decision-making.

- b. Being a member of a club or organisation that receives funding from a gaming grant will not usually give rise to a conflict of interest when it comes to deciding or discussing Council's gambling venue policy, unless that member holds a paid role (e.g. a coach who is paid for that service).
 - c. Being a member or a club or organisation that operates a gaming licence will give rise to a conflict of interest, particularly where the elected member serves in an executive role at the club or organisation.
 - d. Where an elected member, outside of a debate on the issue, had expressed a view on the gambling venue policy that suggests that they do not and cannot have an open mind on the matter, this could give rise to a conflict of interest on the grounds of predetermination.
2. The fact that Council may have previously been the recipient of gaming grant money would not create a conflict of interest when deciding its gambling venue policy. Such democratic decision-making is fundamental to its role and is distinguishable from regulatory or quasi-judicial decision-making where appointment of an independent commissioner may be appropriate to avoid any appearance of bias. The decision-making processes in the Local Government Act 2002 (**LGA**) already impose important requirements to ensure that such decision-making involves consideration of broader community views and not just the interests of Council as an organisation. It would therefore be unnecessary and inappropriate to appoint an independent commissioner because Council initiatives may have previously benefited from gaming grants.

ANALYSIS

3. Under section 101 of the Gambling Act 2003 (**GA**), territorial authorities must, using the special consultative procedure in section 83 of the LGA, adopt a policy that specifies whether class 4 venues may be established in the district, and if so, where they may be located (**the policy**). The policy may also specify any restrictions on the maximum number of gaming machines that may be operated at a class 4 venue and may include a relocation policy.

Does membership of an organisation or club create a conflict of interest for participation in discussion or decision-making on gambling venue policies?

4. It is not uncommon for councillors to be members of organisations and clubs, some of which may receive grant funding from gaming machines. This raises the question of whether membership of such a club or organisation would constitute a conflict of interest that would prevent the councillor from participating in discussion or decision-making regarding the policy.
5. Broadly speaking, a conflict of interest occurs when an elected member is affected by some other interest that he or she has in their private life. There are different types of conflict of interest:

- a. Financial conflicts of interest – where the member (or their spouse or partner) has a direct or indirect financial interest in a particular decision, they cannot discuss or vote on the matter.¹
- b. Non-financial conflicts of interest.

Financial conflicts of interest

6. The applicable legislation is the Local Authorities (Members' Interests) Act 1968 (**LAMIA**). While the LAMIA does not define what a financial interest is, section 6(2) outlines a number of examples where a member will be deemed to have a financial interest:
 - The member, or his or her spouse, owns 10% or more of the issued capital of an incorporated company or any company controlling that company, that has a pecuniary interest (direct or indirect) in a matter before the local authority or committee; or
 - The member, or his or her spouse, is a member of the company and either of them is the managing director or the general manager of the company; or
 - The member, or his or her spouse, is a member of a company controlling the company having a pecuniary interest in the matter before the local authority or committee, and either the member, or his or her spouse, is the managing director or the general manager; or
 - The member, or his or her spouse, is the managing director or general manager of the company, and either of them is a member of a company controlling that company.
7. Other than these examples, the LAMIA does not define what a "financial interest" is. However, the Auditor-General has described a "financial interest" as "a reasonable expectation of financial loss or gain from the particular decision".²
8. It is unlikely that membership alone of a community organisation that receives gaming grant funding would give rise to a financial interest. This is because such organisations and clubs are usually run on a not-for-profit basis. One example where a financial interest could potentially arise would be if the member were in a paid position at the club or organisation, and the funding for that position comes from gaming grants. Another example may be where there is a prospect that membership fees or subscriptions to a club could be affected by the amount of gaming grant funding. However, given that gambling venue policies are relatively high-level in nature and do not directly address matters such as the licensing of particular venues (which involve a separate decision-

¹ Section 6(1) of the Local Authorities (Members' Interests) Act 1968.

² Controller and Auditor-General, **Local Authorities (Members' Interests) Act 1968: A Guide for members of local authorities on managing financial conflicts of interest**, June 2020, at 4.15, referring to the definition of a financial interest in **Downward v Babington** [1975] VR 872.

making process, often by Council officers acting under delegated authority), or allocation of gaming grants (which are decided by the organisations that operate gaming licences subject to statutory requirements), any such potential impact is likely to be too speculative or remote to constitute a financial interest in the decision-making on a gambling venue policy.

9. Notwithstanding this view, where an elected member may receive a financial benefit of the kind described above from a club or organisation receiving gaming grant funding, they may as a matter of prudence wish to first obtain an exemption from the Auditor-General under section 6(3)(f) of the LAMIA (on the grounds that the financial interest is too remote or insignificant to be regarded as likely to influence him or her in voting or taking part in the discussion of the policy) before participating in discussion or decision-making on the policy. It is a relatively simple process to apply for such an exemption.

Non-financial conflicts of interest

10. A non-financial conflict of interest is any situation where a member is not affected financially by a decision but is affected in some other way that may constitute bias or the appearance of bias. Non-financial conflicts of interest are relevant to the avoidance of bias in decision-making. As opposed to financial interests, which can create personal liability for an elected member, bias is a matter of Council's accountability to the public. The avoidance of bias is part of the administrative law principles of natural justice, which require the Council to act fairly in reaching its decisions. The fairness principle has been described in these terms:³

In exercising that discretion, as in exercising any other administrative function, they [members] owe a constitutional duty to perform it fairly and honestly ... What is a fair procedure to be adopted at a particular enquiry will depend upon the nature of its subject matter.

11. The test for whether an interest may give rise to an apparent bias has been stated by the Court of Appeal as being where circumstances:⁴

...might lead a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the instant case.

12. Unlike a financial conflict of interest, a potential non-financial conflict does not automatically exclude a member from participating in a decision. It will depend on how serious the conflict is. The Auditor-General has suggested a number of factors that may be relevant to an assessment of whether a potential conflict is serious enough to exclude a member from participation in decision-making. They include:⁵

- The type or size of the person's other interest;
- The nature or significance of the particular decision or activity being carried out by the public organisation;
- The extent to which the person's other interest could specifically affect, or be affected by, the public organisation's decision or activity; and

³ **Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment** [1981] AC 75, 95.

⁴ **Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue** [2007] 3 NZLR 495.

⁵ Controller and Auditor-General, **Managing conflicts of interest: A guide for the public sector**, June 2020, at 4.31.

- The nature or extent of the person's current or intended involvement in the public organisation's decision or activity.

13. In our view, in the context of decision-making on a gambling venue policy, the mere fact that an elected member is also a lay member of an organisation or club that receives gaming grant funding is unlikely to give rise to a conflict of interest. This is because of the level of remoteness from any possible benefit or loss associated with the decision-making. In most cases, the contents of a gambling venue policy will not directly impact on funding that has or may be received by a club or organisation from gaming machine grants. The purpose of the policy is to specify whether class 4 venues may be established, and if so their location. It can also specify restrictions on the number of gaming machines that may operate at a class 4 venue. Such matters do not necessarily impact directly on whether a club or organisation may receive gaming grant funding, and if so, the amount of any such grant. Funding decisions are made by the organisations who operate the gaming machines, not the Council. The fact that a member, by virtue of membership of a club or organisation that has received gaming grants, has knowledge or experience of the beneficial impacts that gaming grants can have on the community does not give rise to a conflict of interest. To the contrary, it may contribute to a fair and balanced consideration of the issues arising when making decisions on a gambling venue policy. This would be consistent with the purpose of the of the GA, which is *inter alia* to ensure that money from gambling benefits the community and to facilitate community involvement in decisions about the provision of gambling.⁶

14. It is important to distinguish between membership of a club or organisation that receives gaming grants, and membership of a club or organisation that holds a gaming licence. In our view, while the former would not give rise to a conflict of interest in decision-making on a gambling venue policy, there is a much greater likelihood that the latter could give rise to a conflict of interest. This is particularly the case if the elected member holds an executive role in the club or organisation that operates a gaming licence. This is because, while a gambling venue policy does not specify whether or not a particular club or organisation is able to obtain a gaming licence *per se*, the policy may affect the eligibility of a club or organisation to hold a licence. As such, participation in the discussion or decision-making by a member of any such club or organisation could create an appearance of bias and therefore a conflict of interest.

15. Elected members should also always be mindful of avoiding predetermination, i.e., approaching decision-making with a closed mind. Elected members are entitled (and expected) to bring their previous knowledge and experiences to decision-making, but to approach any decision with an open mind. This means that elected members should be cautious about being vocal, other than in the course of Council debates, about particular views in a manner that may suggest that they do not and cannot have an open mind on a particular matter. This is because a conflict of interest may arise as a result of possible predetermination (i.e. actual or perceived bias).

16. In summary:

⁶ Section 3 of the GA.

- a. If an elected member has a financial interest in a club or organisation that may be impacted by the gambling venue policy, the member must not participate in any discussion or decision-making on the policy. It would be rare for a financial interest to arise in this context, but examples may be where the elected member is in a paid role at a club or organisation, and the role is funded from a gaming grant. A more remote interest may arise where the quantum of fees paid to a club or organisation may be impacted by a gaming grant. In those circumstances, it may be prudent to seek a decision from the Auditor-General as to whether the potential interest is deemed to remote to influence decision-making.
- b. Being a member of a club or organisation that receives funding from a gaming grant will not usually give rise to a conflict of interest when it comes to deciding or discussing Council's gaming venue policy.
- c. Being a member of a club or organisation that operates a gaming licence will give rise to a conflict of interest, particularly where the elected member serves in an executive role at the club or organisation.
- d. Where an elected member, outside of a debate on the issue, has expressed a view on the gambling venue policy that suggests that they do not and cannot have an open mind on the matter, this could give rise to a conflict of interest on the grounds of predetermination.

Would Council be conflicted in deciding a gambling venue policy because it has previously received gaming grants?

17. Council initiatives will frequently fall within the second category of the definition of an "authorised purpose" for which gaming proceeds may be used, as set out in section 4 of the GA i.e., "a non-commercial purpose that is beneficial to the whole or a section of the community". Notwithstanding the eligibility for Council initiatives to receive gaming grants, Parliament conferred territorial authorities with the responsibility of formulating a gaming venue policy for their districts. We do not consider that any conflict of interest would arise in relation to decision-making on a gambling venue policy because the Council may have previously been awarded gaming grants. This is because:

- a. While individual elected members are subject to the LAMIA which prevents them from participating in decision-making where they have a financial interest, Council as an entity is not subject to the LAMIA.
- b. Caselaw recognises the inevitability of a degree of conflict within councils when exercising certain statutory functions. It is established, for example, that a council may object to its own district plan, prosecute itself, and apply to itself for a resource consent.
- c. The standard of impartiality for a Council is that it must approach its duty of inquiring into submissions with an open mind.⁷ Given the requirement to undertake a special consultative process and the diverse views of individual members, it is unlikely that the fact that certain projects

⁷ *Lower Hutt City Council v Bank* [1974] 1 NZLR 545 at 550.

undertaken by Council have benefited from gaming grants would unduly influence Council decision-making on its gambling venue policy. For the same reasons outlined above in relation to individual members, the connection between gaming grant money and decision-making on gambling venues is too remote to constitute a conflict of interest. In any event, compliance with the statutory rules in the LGA regarding decision-making by local authorities⁸ and the general principles relating to local authorities⁹ are intended to ensure that Council decision-making is open, transparent, and has regard to the diversity of community interests, notwithstanding the many facets and activities undertaken by Council.

18. We note that Council is not undertaking a quasi-judicial role when formulating a gambling venue policy. There is greater need to avoid the appearance of bias when it comes to regulatory or quasi-judicial decision making (such as considering a resource consent application). In those circumstances, where there is an apparent conflict in Council's interests, it is common for Council to delegate its decision-making to an independent commissioner. To that end, the Resource Management Act 1991 (**RMA**) specifically allows for the appointment of independent commissioners to decide consent applications. However, while Council may delegate its decision-making on a gambling venue policy to a particular committee or sub-committee of Council, it would be unnecessary (and in our view, inappropriate) to delegate such decision-making to an independent commissioner.

Yours faithfully
BROOKFIELDS



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⁸ Section 76 of the LGA.

⁹ Section 14 of the LGA.

